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Social construction of (post)postsocialist reality: 
ethnographic research into the everyday1 
In this paper, I want to discuss the main proposition from Berger and Luckmann’s seminal 
book, The social construction of reality (or. 1966) – the idea that the everyday is the arena 
through which the social world comes into being--and to pair it with the understanding of 
memories and everyday life in postsocialist studies. It seems that various disciplines dealing 
with postsocialism sometimes treat the memories of socialism as an untheorized background 
of the analysis. I propose that postsocialist studies should do better by actively engaging in 
understanding the memories of socialism (and its aftermath) as an active force in shaping the 
present that should be addressed not only through the narratives of the past, but through the 
concept of the “everyday.” For that purpose, I deploy the contemporary Western idea of 
ethnography as a specific qualitative study of the present that can be a useful tool for the 
understanding of society and social reality in the way they are described by Berger and 
Luckmann. I believe that Berger and Luckmann’s account may shed new light on some of 
the central topics of related to the post-Yugoslav predicament (like the state, society, 
morality, and “normality”) and I offer new readings of some scholarly works that deal with 
these concepts (including my own).  
Key words: social construction of reality, everyday life, ethnography, (post)postsocialism  
Социјална конструкција (пост)постсоцијалистичке реалности: 
етнографско истраживање свакодневног 
У овом раду анализира се једна од основних теза Бергера и Лукмана изнета у познатој 
књизи Социјална конструкција стварности (ор. 1966) по којој су простор и време 
свакодневице кључни за раузмевање начина на који настаје наша социјалнa стварност. 
Полазећи од постулата Бергера и Лукмана, ауторка указује на могућност употребе 
етнографије као теоријско-методолошког оквира за разумевање постсоцијалистичке 
трансформације у Европи. Објашњавајући значење овог појма, ауторка предлаже да се 
улога сећања (и на социјализам и на прве године „транзиције“) у разумевању 
садашњице и замишљању будућности сагледа посредством анализе свакодневних 
пракси, уместо уобичајеног фокуса на наративе. Користећи наведени теоријско-
методолошки оквир, ауторка нуди ново читање неких од централних тема 
                                                        
1 This paper is published as a part of the project "Cultural heritage and identity” (177026) fi-
nanced by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia. 
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постсоцијалистичке трансформације у Србији, као што су друшто, држава морал и 
„нормалност“. 
Кључне речи: социјална конструкција стварности, свакодневни живот, етнографија, 
(пост)постсоцијализам  
Introduction: what was postsocialism and what comes next 
There is a hot debate about the scope and meaning of postsocialist studies. 
Some authors claim that social life in the region usually labeled as “postsocialist” 
“is not reducible to an outcome of the recent histories” (Empson 2011, 24). Others, 
like David Kideckel, reject the category altogether, as it defines societies by what 
they are not, rather than what they are (Kideckel 2004, 115). My understanding of 
postsocialism stems from the idea of postsocialism as a category “that marks the 
post–Cold War reconfiguration of power relations and the ideological and geopolit-
ical fault lines that continue to shape the present” (Dzenovska and Kurtović 2015). 
In accordance with Dzenovksa and Kurtović (2015), I use the term “postsocialism” 
to denote “the specific features of actually existing post–Cold War liberalisms that 
come into view when we deploy socialism and postsocialism as heuristic devices” 
(Dzenovska and Kurtović 2015). Although I find Dzenovska and Kurtović’s ac-
count extremely helpful, I would like to add the term post-postsocialism to postso-
cialist vocabulary in order to indicate the way in which people in the former Yugo-
slavia perceive chronology and by so doing to encompass the passage of time2 
which enables them to distinguish between “the transition” of the 1990s and the 
transition after “the transition” in the post-2000s.3  
In that sense, it is obvious that (post)postsocialist studies has to deal with 
the past in its life in the present. There seems to be two main academic trends in 
dealing with such necessity. On the one hand, those who deal with the present seem 
to treat the memories of socialism (or those of the immediate transitional years of 
the 1990s) as an untheorized background of the analysis or representations of the 
past, while, on the other hand, those dealing with the past treat memories through 
objects and/or narratives disconnecting them from the contemporary practices of the 
current “posts.“ I propose that postsocialist studies should do better by actively en-
gaging in understanding memories of socialism as an active force in shaping the 
present that should be addressed not only through the narratives of the past, but 
                                                        
2 The passage of time is of crucial importance in/for postsocialist studies more generally. Some 
recent studies even use the term such as “(post)socialism“ (see Thelen 2011, 2012; Dunn and 
Verdery 2011), but the debate surrounding this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. The issue 
of time will be addressed through the discussion of importance of time for Berger and Luck-
mann’s account and its convergence with the study of postsocialism.  
3 Dzenovska and Kutorvić’s (2015) account may imply „post-postsocialism“ under the umbrella 
term “postsocialism“ and, in that sense, I agree that post-postsocialism is still “part“ of postsocial-
ism understood as an exploratory tool, but I still find it helpful to add the new term for the reasons 
explained. Thus, I will use both terms interchangeably.  
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through the concept of the “everyday.”4 For that purpose, I will deploy the contem-
porary Western idea of ethnography as a specific qualitative study of the present 
that can be a useful tool for the understanding of society and social reality in the 
way they are described by Berger and Luckmann (1991) in their seminal work The 
social construction of reality (or. 1966). I believe that Berger and Luckmann’s ac-
count my shed new light on some of the central topics of regarding the post-
Yugoslav predicament (like the state, society, morality, and “normality”) and my 
aim is to offer new readings of some scholarly works that deal with these concepts 
(including my own).  
Everyday and memory in The social construction of reality…  
Berger and Luckmann operate with a few basic principles: social order is 
the result of human actions. It is produced by humans through their current disposi-
tions and practices. Thus, it exists only as a continuous human product. We cannot 
give it any other ontological status, since we will obscure its empirical manifesta-
tions. The process of institutionalization is based on the habitualization – it occurs 
whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors 
(Berger and Luckmann 1991, 72). This habitualization and its consequent institu-
tionalization originate in everyday life making the “everyday” crucial for the social 
construction of reality. “Among multiple realties,” the reality of everyday life “pre-
sents itself as the reality par excellence” (p. 35). It is constantly reiterated through 
every day activities, making the “everyday” and reality mutually constitutive.5  
 There is a temporal dimension to the everyday – it is embedded in the pre-
sent. Raymond Williams (1977) considers time to be the most important aspect of 
our everyday experience of society. As Berger and Luckmann explain, “the world 
of everyday life is structured both spatially and temporally” (p. 40). According to 
them, it is organized around the “'here' of my body and the 'now' of my present” 
(Berger and Luckmann 1991, 36); “both dimensions constitute the real of the sub-
jects’ consciousness” (Rizo García 2015, 23). Thus, in order to understand the so-
cial reality in any of its temporal dimensions, one has to study the here and now. 
Still, although social reality is embedded in the present, it does not exhaust itself in 
                                                        
4 Although it was a staple of anthropological knowledge from the days of Malinowski in the late 
1920s, the concept of “everyday” acquired a wider use in sociology and other disciplines after its 
theoretical elaboration in the works of Berger and Luckmann (1966), Henri Lefebvre (2000, or. 
1971), and Michael de Certeau (1984, or. 1980), although it figured prominently in the work of 
Raymond Williams (1977) as well. 
5 For Luckmann and Berger “everyday reality” is considered to be “ordinary,” “mundane reality” 
unlike “special worlds” of aesthetic or religious experience (or theory for that matter). It seems to 
me that this idea of the ordinary and the exclusion of the religious experience from it, stems from 
the Durkhemian sociological tradition that separates the world of the secret from that of the mun-
dane (for example in the work of Mary Douglas) and Berger and Luckman equate the later with 
the ordinary. I find this equation problematic as it seems to me that there are numerous ways to 
consider religious experiences to be “every day experiences” if not mundane. Similar applies to 
Luckmann and Berger’s idea of aesthetics.  
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the present, as “it also covers phenomena that occurred in the past” (Rizo García 
2015, 23). But the present is the point from where the subject can experience the 
daily life in its gradual proximity or remoteness, both in temporal and spatial terms. 
This temporal remoteness, argues Burkitt (2004) in his take on Williams, “enables 
us to experience the social world as an objective formation of fixed and stable insti-
tutions and ideologies that are somehow separate from subjective experience” (p. 
219). As Williams further explains, “thus, relationships, institutions and formations 
in which we are still actively involved are converted, by this procedural mode, into 
formed wholes rather than forming and formative processes” (Burkitt 2004, 219).  
This is all well known to the students of memory studies. Despite some im-
portant oppositional voices, such as the famous French historian Pierre Nora 
(1996),6 it is widely acknowledged that memory is the result of social practice, mal-
leable phenomenon that is produced in the present and are also a function of it (cf. 
for example Radstone and Schwarz 2010).7 The only way to approach the memory 
is through the study of the present. Put differently, the study of the present is by vir-
tue of the necessity pertinent to its subject matter the study of memory. There are 
various possible ways to study the present (and memories as its constituent), but if 
we follow Berger and Luckmann’s idea that social reality is constructed through 
everyday life, then ethnography, may be one of the most suitable ways of reaching 
it. 
From everyday to ethnography  
The most common understanding of ethnography is that it is a [method] of 
studying social and cultural phenomena in action (Murchison 2010, 3). Although 
ethnography can be about the everyday and/or mundane, it is not about any mun-
dane. It is about the mundane (or the extraordinary for that matter) in the present.8 
In that sense, I find it important to separate the study of the everyday (however de-
fined) from ethnography. In my view, ethnography is the study of the present 
                                                        
6 It is important to stress that Nora’s argument is not that “memory is objective” in line with van 
Ranke’s idea of “objective history.” Rather, he argues that in a modern society, lived memory is 
lost and we live in the constant simulacra of remembering. This is similar to Berger and Luck-
mann’s concepts of “habitualization” and “institutionalization.” They consider reality as everyday 
reality of intersubjectivity. In other words, reality comes to being through face to face interaction 
that becomes progressively anonymous as we distance ourselves from the here and now of the 
face to face situations. Still, for Berger and Luckmann, this is the process that applies to all socie-
ties across space and time, while for Nora, that is a historical specificity of modern (European) 
societies.  
7 Similarly, David Lowenthal, one of the most important historians dealing with memories, argues 
that any memory of the past must be seen as an “artifact of the present,” inextricable from its sur-
rounding context of ideas and institutions (Lowenthal 1985, xvi). 
8Actually, ethnographies quite often deal with “the extraordinary” either in terms of frequency of 
certain phenomena or their interpretations as such by subjects involved. Their non-everyday 
quality usually forces ethnographers to ground their meanings in contrast to everyday practices 
and occurrences, which is also Berger and Luckmann’s theoretical proposition.  
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through physical presence of the researcher who actively engages with his or her 
subjects. Ethnographies may be about the past in/through the present, but they are 
not the study of the past through the past itself (available through archives for ex-
ample – although there might be ethnographies of archives production or their use). 
Hence, it is possible to study the everyday in the past, as did for example Sheila 
Fitzpatrick (2000) in her book on “everyday Stalinism” in Soviet Russia in the 
1930s, or Andrea Matošević (2015) in his book on shock work in Yugoslavia. I be-
lieve that in order for a study of shock work in socialist self-management to be eth-
nographic, this specific dynamics of statecraft has to be “channelled through the 
recollections” of people involved (Jansen 2015, 28).  
This is not methodological exaggeration about the proper use of the term 
“ethnography,” or an attempt to impose a specific Anglophone theoretical vision of 
the concept. I am well aware of various ethnographic traditions in which the term 
figures as “the description of the people” that is not necessarily tied to the study of 
the present, but I believe that there is something to be gained from treating ethnog-
raphy as the specific qualitative study of the here and now. It may be argued that the 
dynamic characterizing ethnographic research is aptly depicted as follows:  
“by assuming an intrinsic link between what is observed objectively 
and the subjective interpretation given to it, the researcher explains 
how people give objects and actions meaning in accordance with their 
beliefs and the conventions of society. Reality is thus appreciated as 
inseparable from human experience, with knowledge deemed as exist-
ing only in a social context” (Bray 2008, 301-302).  
Jansen’s (2015) book about yearning for “normal life” in Sarajevo, concep-
tualizes normality exactly in terms of lives (i.e., experience), which makes him 
question how to approach such elusive phenomena.9 He casts light on the issues:  
“in Dayton BiH, everyone said that current life was not normal, and 
was not about to become normal any time soon. The shared concern 
with ‘normal lives’ could therefore not be studied empirically through 
a description of people’s routines (the ‘is’)” (Jansen 2015, 43).  
He asks how the presentist methodology of ethnography can approach 
“normal lives” “in a situation where they appear only as an absence, as the affec-
tively overcharged object of evocations of what ‘was’ and what ‘ought to be’?” 
(Jansen 2015). Furthermore, his emphasis on the future or, more precisely, on the 
hope for the future (there can also be hopes about the past) makes him rethink eth-
nography and its “presentist” character as ill-equipped to deal with the future. One 
possibility to avoid this predicament is to focus on memories in conjunction with 
their future oriented counterparts. This fits well into the traditional ethnographic 
                                                        
9 The idea of normality figures prominently in scholarly analyses of the former Soviet Socialist 
Republics and post-Yugoslav spaces (Erdei 2006; Greenberg 2011; Simić 2014). Yet, what counts 
as “normal” may vary across the postsocialist world. Sometimes, the idea of normality is concep-
tualized through consumption (Crowley 2000; Fehervary 2002; Rasuing 2002), but it is not the 
only means through which people construct and understand it (see also Simić 2018b). 
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approaches that privilege the past in the present due to their focus on “what we can 
observe, and we can only observe what is” (ibid) that necessarily “includes traces of 
what was’” (Jansen 2015).  
This approach resonates with Berger and Luckmann’s main conceptions 
about the way society itself (not only social reality) gets constructed. According to 
them, society is an objectively existing entity, but it is built through the practices 
through which subjective meanings are expressed. In other words, through social 
actions, social meanings become social facts. That is society’s “double character” – 
it is determined both through the objective facticity and the subjective meanings, 
which makes it “sui generis reality.”10 For that reason it is usually said that Berger 
and Luckmann’s account reconciles Weber’s and Durkheimian’s respective sociol-
ogies in a singular sociological theory of knowledge.11 This dual character of the 
social is a well-known anthropological premise that enables ethnographers to un-
derstand both natives’ point of view and to explain it in the wider context (social, 
cultural, political, and the like). In line with Berger and Luckmann’s main argu-
ment, ethnography is based on the idea that the key to knowledge is human experi-
ence, both in terms of its production and its understanding. In that sense, if we want 
to understand the postsocialist present, we need to ground it in the current circum-
stances from where we can look both at the past and the future.  
(Post)postsocialist dissolution of the everyday  
To my knowledge, there are no ethnographic studies of postsocialism that 
directly engage with Berger and Luckmann’s account. Some other postsocialist 
studies-- although dealing with “social construction”-- do not mention Berger and 
Luckmann at all (for example Wilmer 2002). Still, it seems that Berger and Luck-
mann’s account of the “order of everyday life” offers a perfect theoretical back-
ground for the understanding of the postsocialist “disorder.” Berger and Luckmann 
state that phenomena of (social) reality are “prearranged in patterns that seem to be 
independent” of our “apprehension of them and that [they] impose themselves upon 
the latter” (Berger and Luckmann 1991, 35). We apprehend that reality as the or-
dered reality of everyday life. Most ethnographic studies about the postsocialist 
condition immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall noted that for most people, 
alongside the Wall, collapsed ordered reality of everyday life. Nazpary (2002), for 
                                                        
10 This subjective-objective split in sociological thought is usually ascribed to the traditions of 
Weber and Durkheim. For Weber, the only way to make sense of things sociologically is to un-
derstand their meaning for the actors involved. The aim of sociology is to understand subjective 
meanings of action (Weber 1978, or. 1922), while Durkheim famously proclaimed, the “first and 
the most important rule” of a sociological method is: “treat social facts as things” (Durkheim 
1982, 60). 
11 Berger and Luckmann were determined to put their theory of knowledge aside from the main-
stream of sociological theories of knowledge. Although it builds on Weber and Durkheim, it is 
widely accepted that their book “re-defines a materialistically based sociology of knowledge by 
founding a sociological theory on phenomenology and philosophical anthropology” (Dreher 2016, 
53). 
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example, describes the 1990s in Kazakhstan as the time of “chaos” (bardak). Naz-
pary provides a neo-Marxist analysis, in which he writes that postsocialist chaotic 
mode of domination lead to  
“a total void which permeate[d] all aspects of life. […] The break-
down of social trust and the sudden emergence of the random and in-
visible logic of the market […] create[d] the experience of a very on-
tological disruption” (emphasis added, Nazpary 2002, 4).  
Similarly, Pedersen (2011) writes that in 1990s, for the people in northern 
Mongolia this “relentless breakdown of the world as people had known it, was not 
conceived of as merely a transition from one political and economic system to an-
other,” but rather “a veritable ontological meltdown, as the once immutable institu-
tions of the socialist welfare state (such as infrastructure, health services, and edu-
cation) gradually crumbled to dust” (Pedersen 2011, 8). Pedersen’s analysis differs 
from those of Nazpary, as he argues that agsan (quintessentially postsocialist phe-
nomenon that refers to the disturbing condition of drunken rage) was “not simply 
understood by people in Ulaan-Uul as being caused by rising unemployment and 
the neoliberal downsizing of the state” (ibid, 4), but they embody the ontological 
quality of the world as such. In other words, it was not only about how people see 
things, but it was about the postsocialist world as it was (for ontology in postsocial-
ist anthropology, see Simić 2018a).  
The postsocialist condition is characterized by a constant sense of elusive-
ness and permanently fluctuating social norms making their changing quality seem 
to have become the new ordinary (for various postsocialist settings where the above 
applies, cf. for example Pedersen 2011, Brković 2017). However, it is disputable if 
this „ordinariness“ is equated with normality. Thus, although socialist Yugoslavia 
was rather different from the Soviet Union or Mongolia, the fall of socialism creat-
ed a sense of chaos that in subsequent years turned into a prolonged feeling of un-
certainty and “permanent transition” usually called simply “situation” (situacija). 
Situacija denotes “the state of affairs as it is,” which applies not only to the circum-
stances of the Serbian state (corruption or inefficiency, for example) but also to 
“moral and social degradation” that developed during the 1990s and has been going 
on ever since (Simić 2016, 94). It is “a place of specific liminality” (Jansen 2005, 
99) that trapped people in the region in permanent transition of the future not-yet-
to-come.  
 In order to understand both the ontological quality of the situation and the 
feelings of liminality (i.e., the social world as it is and the way we interpret it), we 
may again look at Berger and Lukmann’s account. For them, the order of social re-
ality is connected with the knowledgeable. As they further explain, “what is taken 
for granted as knowledge in the society comes to be coextensive with the knowable, 
or at any rate provides the framework within which anything not-yet-known will 
come to be known in the future” (Berger and Luckmann 1991, 83). This knowledge 
is learned through socialization that further mediates the internalization of the ob-
jectivated structures of the social world” (Berger and Luckmann 1991, 83). A 
properly socialized individual considers his social world as a consistent whole, 
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which makes him/her ready to explain both “its functioning and malfunctioning in 
terms of this 'knowledge'” (Berger and Luckmann 1991, 82). Of course it does not 
mean that social institutions indeed function and integrate as they are “supposed 
to,” as it sometimes seems in some functionalist explanations (Berger and Luck-
mann 1991, 222). Nor do people experience them as such. 
Accordingly, in his study of the “last Soviet generation” – people who 
came of age in the early and mid 1970s in Leningrad--Yurchak (2006) writes that 
most people in the late socialist period considered official state ideology to have lit-
tle relation to the everyday life experience. Still, they believed that “the system” 
was there to stay. He explains that for many, socialism was a system of human val-
ues that sustained everyday reality of “normal life” (normal’naia zhizn) (cf. very 
similar accounts for the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia in Jansen 2015). In 
line with Berger and Luckmann’s main argument, the system was seen (even if 
falsely for the great part) as “omnipresent and immutable” (Yurchak 2006, 183-
184) to the extent that its fall came to a great surprise for many.12 
 It seems that this surprise and disbelief stem from the idea that “normality” 
cannot disintegrate, since abnormality is simply unthinkable – without normality 
there is no framework that makes the future knowledgeable. I find this idea of nor-
mality particularly important for the understanding of the (post)postsocialist predic-
ament. It can be applied equally to people, institutions, societies, and states in order 
to denote that something is ordinary in a good way: stable and predictable. It can be 
used for the description of the past, as for example in Yurchak’s (2006) account of 
postsocialist Russia, but it can also be part of the hopes for the future as we saw it in 
Jansen’s (2015) account of Sarajevo mentioned before. In both cases, the idea en-
compasses everyday life as including both the “official” practices of the state and 
state institutions and “unofficial” practices that seem to be outside of it.  
My recent research in Serbia shows that “normality,” understood as certain 
living standards, has been somewhat restored, but the yearning for normal life 
seems to be here to stay (Simić 2016). This normality refers to the totality of social 
fabric. These beliefs are were widely shared among people from various social stra-
ta. The people with whom I have worked since the mid-2000s belong to different 
social classes and age groups. Their common characteristic is that they do not be-
long to the new economic and political elites, but they are not “transition losers” ei-
ther. They commonly perceive society as a structured form of social interaction 
with values, rules, and regulations resembling Durkheim’s (Durkheim 1994, 2002) 
idea that society is brought into existence by people’s moral beliefs and a sense of 
obligation toward one another. If this erodes, society begins to suffer from anomie, 
which is a condition of instability resulting from a breakdown of standards and val-
ues in a society as a whole (Simić 2016, 101).  
                                                        
12 Everyday cynical distance between everyday practices and events organized by the Party (like 
parades, for example) opened up the space for the reconciliation between one’s disbelief in offi-
cial ideology and one’s own participation in its reproduction (Yurchak 1997, 171). This cynical 
distance enabled the persistence of the (late) socialist system at least in the worldview of 
Yurchak’s interlocutors. 
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 Durkheim describes anomie as connected with egoism (Watts Miller 2003), 
while egoism is described as a “modern ill” – “morally unconstrained pursuit of 
self-interest” or “a self-absorbed withdrawal that numbs feelings of attachment to 
our milieu” (ibid, 4). “This is part of a pathology” that Durkheim later diagnosed as 
anomie — “unfettered, morally unconstrained and limitless desire” (Watts Miller 
2003, 4). Durkheim insists that morality depends on the sense of obligation or duty 
for which we are motivated “by respect for the moral law’s imperative authority, 
and by the will to control and order the crowd of our desires” (Watts Miller 2003, 
11). In that sense, for Durkheim, solidarity is the very condition of social life and 
the source of morality (Watts Miller 2003, 25, see Simić 2016).  
People deploy similar ideas of morality and order in understanding of 
community and society. For them, society as a whole is based on a moral order, 
while solidarity is understood as a cement of social life and moral order without 
which the society ceases to exist. Although the disruption of this moral order was 
rather sudden – a consequence of the 1990s fall [from grace of socialism] that pro-
duced “acute anomie” (cf. Besnard 2005 the classification of anomie in Durkheim’s 
work) or temporary absence of norms--it seems that the anomic situation has be-
come chronic.” These ideas of normlessness have been variously used in local poli-
tics as a reason for its oppressive turn, but what interests me here is the liberating 
potential of the grassroot critique of social anomie in its everyday social and politi-
cal nexus.  
The collapse of socialism went hand in hand with the global neoliberal 
turn. As Boris Buden (2017, 347) wrote in the Afterword to the recent edited collec-
tion on post-postsocialism, “the world of late industrial modernity was collapsing, 
and turning its eyes away from the future” – a future in which there was no place 
for social welfare state and not for the society either. In accordance with Margaret 
Thatcher’s famous proclamation “there is no such thing as society,” it seems that 
the “age of society was politically over” (Buden 2017, 347). Consequently, the very 
idea that normality consists of participation in the “society” seems like an odd rem-
nant of the past.13  
In contemporary Western politics, the idea of community is usually op-
posed to the idea of society. In her critique of the idea of community, Joseph (2002) 
combines the insights of Marx and Judith Butler and claims that social formations 
are made possible through the performativity of (social and cultural) production that 
makes “capitalism the very medium in which community is enacted” (Joseph 2002, 
xxxii). She observes that the usual discourse of community “contrasts community to 
                                                        
13 In the nineteenth century England, for example, “society” was usually understood as involving 
a particular group of people with certain social relations. People could be members of “society,” 
or they could go, visit, or participate in “society” (society happened in particular places and 
times); but there were also people who were too humble to be acceptable to “society” (as in Jane 
Austen novels, for example). In other words, society was understood as very concrete: it meant a 
group of people who formed the elite and who interacted in a particular elite way, which also 
meant that it was strictly hierarchical and class based.  
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modern capitalist society structurally: the foundation of community is supposed to 
be values, while capitalist society is based only on value (economic value)” (Joseph 
2002, 1). Still, I do not think that contemporary society “is a sort of death mask” for 
“the politically death concept” as Buden writes (Buden 2017, 347). Buden argues 
that “in its political post-mortem, society is a cultural artefact that no longer hosts 
real life but provides commemoration” (Buden 2017, 347). Yugoslav society, as a 
reified entity (as found for example in museums or some academic writings), might 
be exactly that. Yet, I think that the idea of society as evoked by the so called ordi-
nary people in ordinary circumstances has not only a utopian, but also a hope evok-
ing quality.  
In that sense, I find the study of the present embedded in the physical pres-
ence in the present especially important. If people in the former Yugoslavia hold on 
to the idea of society that resembles contemporary Western idea of community 
without clear ideas about the future, that is because there is no predictable future, 
not because they are hostages of socialism. The lack of the predictable future makes 
the present opaque, not the other way round. In that sense, in contemporary post-
postsocialist reality, the present is suspended. It is accessible either as a past or the 
future of (proper) capitalism yet to come. However, if we take everyday life to be 
“the arena for an effort towards ‘disalienation,’” making a contribution to the art of 
living and forming a critique of the very everyday from which it stems (Lefebvre 
1991, 40), then ethnography embedded in Luckmann and Berger’s theory should 
provide fertile ground for its understanding.  
Conclusion  
To find the concept of everyday life taken as the “the single plane of im-
manence” in which official and unofficial “practices and articulation interrelate and 
affect one another” (Burkitt 2004, 211) is very important for the understanding of 
the postsocialist quandary. As Burkitt (2004) explains, “everyday life must relate to 
all daily activities” simply “because it is here that our social relations are produced 
and reproduced.” It relates to “all activities and is the sum total of relations that 
constitute the human – and every human being – in terms of our collective as well 
as our individual experience” (p. 211). It can help us to avoid the split between the 
institutional and the non-institutional as two separate realms. Following Berger and 
Luckmann, it allows for the arena that can explain the ways in which the very social 
fabric is created. Therefore, I suggested ethnography as the apt methodology for 
such a task. It is important to stress that ethnography should be understood as the 
mode of understanding, not as naïve empiricism. “Being there” has a seemingly 
paradoxical ability to turn our attention to the non-obvious. As Murchison (2010, 
26) explains, participant observation “allows the ethnographer to appreciate multi-
ple perspectives and to engage different types and sources of data.” It should “re-
veal things of which the participant is sometimes unaware, and in other cases partic-
ipation is the only way to gain an experiential understanding of various components 
of cultural and social worlds” (Murchison 2010, 26). It could be argued if we pair 
debates about representation of memories “with the description of everyday lives 
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and situations” (Chushak 2013, 208), we may produce “a much more nuanced pic-
ture of the complex processes of construction of the past” (Chushak 2013, 208) and 
the present. 
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